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Discourse Structure and Anaphora: an
Empirical Study
Abstract
One of the main motivations for studying discourse structure is its effect on the search for
the antecedents of anaphoric expressions. We tested the predictions in this regard of theories
assuming that the structure of a discourse depends on its intentional structure, such as Grosz
and Sidner’s theory. We used a corpus of tutorial dialogues independently annotated according
to Relational Discourse Analysis (RDA), a theory of discourse structure merging ideas from
Grosz and Sidner’s theory with proposals from Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). Using as our
metrics the accessibility of anaphoric antecedents and the reduction in ambiguity brought about
by a particular theory, we found support for Moser and Moore’s proposal that among the units
of discourse assumed by an RST-like theory, only those expressing an intentional ‘core’ (in the
RDA sense) should be viewed as constraining the search for antecedents; units only expressing
informational relations should not introduce separate focus spaces. We also found that the best
compromise between accessibility and ambiguity (’perplexity’) reduction is a model in which
the focus spaces associated with embedded cores and embedded contributors remain on the
stack until the RDA-segment in which they occur is completed, and discuss the implications of
this finding for a stack-based theory.
1 Introduction
One of the main motivations for studying discourse structure is its effect on the search for the an-
tecedents of anaphoric expressions. The recent development of more reliable annotation techniques,
and the increased availability of corpora annotated for discourse structure (Carletta et al. 1997; Moser
et al. 1996; Marcu 1999), have made it possible to subject the claims of seminal theories about the im-
pact of discourse structure on anaphora such as (Reichman 1985; Grosz and Sidner 1986; Fox 1987)
to rigorous empirical testing. Quite a lot of this work has focused on studying the claims of theo-
ries based on Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (Mann and Thompson 1988)–see, e.g., (Cristea et al.
1998, 2000; Ide and Cristea 2000)).1 Our aim in this work was to study the claims of theories that
hypothesize a tight connection between the space of anaphoric antecedents and intentional structure,
the best known among which being the theory proposed by Grosz and Sidner (1986).
Evaluating Grosz and Sidner’s theory used to be a problem, because although it has originated a
coding manual (Nakatani et al. 1995) that has been used at least once (Nakatani 1996), as far as we
know there is no sizeable corpus coded accordingly. However, recent proposals concerning the map-
ping between rhetorical structure and intentional structure (Moser and Moore 1996b) have resulted in
the development of Relational Discourse Analysis (RDA) (Moore and Pollack 1992; Moser and Moore
1996b), a theory of discourse structure merging ideas from RST with ideas from Grosz and Sidner’s
theory. This theory has served as the basis for a coding scheme which has been used to produce cor-
pora containing texts annotated with their intentional structure, as well as other structural properties
of the type hypothesized in RST. These corpora can be used to investigate the claims of Grosz and
1The classic study by Fox (1987) also used RST to analyze the structure of written texts, but Fox couldn’t make use at
the time of standard resources annotated in a reliable way.
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Sidner’s theory, as well as the relation between their view of the connection between discourse struc-
ture and anaphora and views based on RST, such as Fox’s or Veins Theory. The Sherlock corpus of
tutorial dialogues collected at the University of Pittsburgh and subsequently annotated according to
RDA is particularly well suited for these purposes.
In this paper, we first briefly review Grosz and Sidner’s theory and RDA, and discuss how an RDA
analysis can be used to analyze claims about anaphora. We then discuss how we investigated such
claims: our evaluation metrics, our corpus, our annotation methods, and how we used the annotated
corpus to computing the metrics. In the next section of the paper, we discuss first of all the results
we obtained by assuming the simplest view of the mapping between intentional structure in the sense
of RDA and focus stack operations; in particular, we discuss the consequences of the more distinctive
aspect of RDA, the distinction between intentional and informational relations. We then examine look
at more complex ways of mapping intentional cores into Grosz and Sidner’s DSPs –in particular, how
embedded segments of different types should be treated.
2 Background
2.1 Grosz and Sidner’s Theory
As Grosz and Sidner’s (G&S) theory is well-known, we only give a quick summary of its main ideas
here. According to G&S, the structure of a discourse is determined by the intentions that the people
producing it intend to convey, or DISCOURSE SEGMENT PURPOSES (DSPs).2 In a coherent discourse,
all of these DSPs are related to form an INTENTIONAL STRUCTURE by either dominance relations
(in case a particular DSP is interpreted as contributing to the satisfaction of another intention) or
satisfaction-precedes relations (when the satisfaction of an intention is a precondition for the satis-
faction of a second one).
Anaphoric accessibility of entities in a discourse is modeled by its ATTENTIONAL STRUCTURE,
which, according to Grosz and Sidner, is a stack of FOCUS SPACES. G&S propose that when a segment
is open, its corresponding focus space, which includes the discourse entities introduced in that seg-
ment, is pushed onto the focus stack; when the segment is closed, the focus space is popped, and the
discourse entities associated with that focus space are not accessible any more. A further hypothesis of
G&S is that the pushing and popping of focus spaces on the stack reflects the intentional structure, in
the sense that a new focus space is pushed on the stack whenever the discourse introduces a new DSP
subordinate to the present one, and the focus space of the current is popped whenever the associated
DSP is satisfied.
This claim about anaphoric accessibility was illustrated in the original paper with a few examples;
however, as far as we know, it has not been empirically tested. Part of the problem is that there are
no guidelines about how to identify the DSPs in a discourse. Our purpose is therefore twofold: to test
G&S’s claims (with respect to a certain genre and domain), but also to use the insights gained from
work on RDA to clarify the notion of DSP.
2.2 Relational Discourse Analysis
Relational Discourse Analysis (RDA) (Moore and Pollack 1992; Moser and Moore 1996b) is a synthe-
sis of ideas from Grosz and Sidner’s theory (Grosz and Sidner 1986) and Rhetorical Structure Theory
2The reason for the name is that Grosz and Sidner propose that the ‘discourse segments’ of discourse analysis are best
seen as the portions of a discourse concerned with the satisfaction of a given intention.
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(RST) (Mann and Thompson 1988). RDA inherits from Grosz and Sidner’s work the idea that dis-
course structure is determined by intentional structure: each RDA-segment originates with an intention
of the speaker. But RDA-segments are also like RST spans, in that they have additional structure, in
two respects: they are generally associated with relations; and their constituents have different status.
According to RDA, all constituents of a discourse are connected by relations, of which there are
two types: INFORMATIONAL relations that express a connection between facts and events ’in the
world’ (such as causal and temporal relations) and INTENTIONAL ones that express a discourse in-
tention (such as evidence or concession). While a similar distinction is already made in RST between
SUBJECT-MATTER and PRESENTATIONAL relations ((Mann and Thompson 1988), p. 18), in RDA the
distinction has further significance it that only spans of discourse tied by intentional relations form
proper RDA-SEGMENTs (in the sense that they restrict anaphoric accessibility).3 Each such segment
consists of one CORE, i.e., that constituent that most directly expresses the speaker’s intention,4 and
any number of CONTRIBUTORS, the remaining constituents in the segment, each of which plays a
role in serving the purpose expressed by the core (e.g., they may convey information meant to support
the proposition expressed by the core). The distinction between core and contributor is of course re-
lated to the distinction between nucleus and satellite in Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (Mann and
Thompson 1988), according to which in each “segment” (‘text span,’ in RST) one component should
be identified as the ’main’ one, and the others as secondary. However, in RST there is a distinction be-
tween nucleus and satellite for all RST subordinating relations, whereas in RDA a core and contributors
are only identified if a segment purpose has been recognized –i.e., only for RDA-segments.
A distinguish feature of RDA is that in RDA-segments, each contributor is linked to the core by one
intentional relation and one informational relation, as we will see in a moment. This is unlike RST,
in which only a single relation can obtain between nucleus and satellite; this change was proposed in
(Moore and Pollack 1992). Moore and Pollack argue that in examples like (1):
(1) a. George Bush supports big business.
b. He’s sure to veto House bill 1711.
the two units can be viewed as being related by both an intentional evidence relation (with b as a
nucleus, and a as a satellite) and an informational volitional cause one. Furthermore, they argued that
whereas Mann and Thompson claimed that only one relation had to be chosen in such cases (which
they observed), preserving both relations was in fact not only useful to avoid conflicts, but necessary,
to account for the flow of inference both from an interpretation and from a generation point of view.5
In RDA, segment constituents may in turn be other embedded segments, or simpler functional el-
ements. These elements may be either atomic UNITS, i.e., descriptions of domain actions and states,
or CLUSTERS. Clusters are spans that only involve constituents linked by informational relations; no
core:contributor structure exists, but they can themselves be embedded. Note, however, that when
the intentional structure ends – ie, the innermost segment is identified — the text may still analyzed
3A similar distinction is also made in ‘structured’ versions of Discourse Representation Theory such as CRT (Poesio and
Traum 1997), in which temporal and causal relations between events are part of the propositions expressed by speech acts,
whereas a second category of relations relates the speech acts to eachother.
4The core may be implicit: the core of an answer, for example, often turns out to be the presupposition of the question.
5It might be argued that once the units of discourse are analyzed in greater depth, distinguishing between their proposi-
tional content and their force, informational relations and intentional relations may be seen as relating entities at different
levels of analysis (e.g., described events vs. propositions vs. speech acts). Keep in mind however that we are primarily
concerned here in RDA as a tool for corpus analysis; and from an annotation perspective, it is often a good idea not to attempt
distinctions between entities such as events, propositions, and speech acts. As a result, marking both informational relations
and intentional relations as relations between discourse units can be viewed as a useful way of simplifying the annotator’s
task.
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1.1 Before troubleshooting inside the test station,
1.2 it is always best to eliminate both the UUT and TP.
2.1 Since the test package is moved frequently,
2.2 it is prone to damage.
3.1 Also, testing the test package is much easier and faster
3.2 than opening up test station drawers.
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2
step1:step2
Cause:effect
prescribed-act:
wrong-act
Enable
Act:Reason
Act:Reason
Convince
Convince
Figure 1: A tutorial excerpt and its RDA analysis
in terms of embedded clusters, but no cluster can be superordinate to an intentional segment. Unlike
G&S’s theory, but as in RST, RDA is based on a fixed number of relations; in particular, RDA assumes
four intentional relations – convince, enable, concede, joint–and a larger set of informational rela-
tions, which is expected to be domain dependent. In the Sherlock corpus, 23 informational relations
are used, of which 13 pertain to causality (they express relations between two actions, or between
actions and their conditions or effects) (Moser et al. 1996).
Figure 1 shows a small excerpt from one of the dialogues in the Sherlock corpus (UUT is “Unit
under test”, TP is “test package”), and its RDA analysis. The analysis characterizes the text as an
RDA-segment whose core spans 1.1 and 1.2. This segment has two contributors, spanning 2.1 and 2.2,
and 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. (Graphically, the core is signaled as the element at the end of the arrow
whose origin is the contributor; moreover, the link is marked by two relations, intentional (in bold),
and informational.) In this case, the two contributors carry the same intentional and informational
relations to the core, but this doesn’t need to be the case. The core and the second contributor are
further analyzed as informational clusters, whereas the first contributor is recognized as having its
own intentional structure.6 Clusters are marked by one informational relation, but not by intentional
relations. ( In RST, the structure would presumably be the same, although no double relations would
exist, and every relation would have directionality: i.e., for every relation one relatum would be
considered as the nucleus, the other(s) as its satellites. We will come back to the analysis of the text
according to G&S in the next section.)
6According to the manual used for the annotation (Moser et al. 1996), an enable relation holds “if the contributor [2.1]
provides information intended to increase the hearer’s understanding of the material presented in the core, or to increase the
hearer’s ability to perform the action presented in the core.” (p. 6).
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2.1
2.2
1.1
1.2
3.1
3.2
Figure 2: G&S analysis for the text in Fig. 1 on the basis of the proposed mapping of RDA-segments
into G&S segments.
3 Questions Addressed in This Study
3.1 Using an RDA-annotated corpus to evaluate intentional theories
In order to use an annotation based on RDA to evaluate Grosz and Sidner’s claims about the effect
of discourse structure on the search for anaphoric antecedents (Moser and Moore do not propose
modifications to Grosz and Sidner’s theory in this respect) we have to specify how RDA structure
drives focus stack construction. In Grosz and Sidner’s theory, the pushing and popping of focus spaces
is driven by the intentional structure: a new focus space is pushed on the stack whenever the discourse
introduces a new Discourse Segment Purpose (DSP) subordinate to the present one, and the current
focus space is popped when the associated DSP is satisfied. Because RDA analyses of a discourse into
segments are also based on a notion of intention derived from Grosz and Sidner, a very simple (in fact,
possibly too simple) way of specifying focus space update in terms of RDA structure can be derived
from the following partial mapping between RDA notions and G&S’s intentional structure proposed
by Moser and Moore :
1. We only have a DSP when we encounter an intentional substructure: i.e., every DSP must be
associated with a core.
2. Constituents of the RDA structure that do not include cores - i.e., clusters (see above) - do not
introduce DSPs.
The first principle means that a new focus space should only be pushed on the stack when a core is
recognized; i.e., only RDA-segments (discourse spans expressing an intentional relation with a core
and one or more contributors) are also segments in the G&S sense. The second principle states that
discourse spans only connected by informational relations (clusters) do not affect the attentional state.
The segment structure that we would derive from the RDA analysis in Figure 1 by following these
principles would be as in Figure 2. Because informational relations by themselves don’t give rise
to intentional segments, the informational clusters 1.1-1.2 and 3.1-3.2 are not identified as segments
in the sense of Grosz and Sidner: i.e., no new focus space is pushed on the stack in this case. In
particular, the unembedded core in 1.1-1.2 is not treated as a separate focus space even if it constitutes
a cluster, since it expresses (part of) the DSP associated with the overall RDA-segment.
The claim that only intentional relations result in new focus spaces being pushed on the stack
already results in different predictions concerning the search for anaphoric antecedents than analyses
similarly based on RST-like repertoires of relations, but in which all subordinating RST relations are
taken to limit accessibility. This is therefore the first interesting claim to test.
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3.2 Embedded Segments and The Relation between G&S’s Theory and Other Theories
of Anaphoric Accessibility
An RDA-style analysis assigns to a discourse a much more detailed structure than the one we would
expect to see on the basis of Grosz and Sidner’ ideas. In RDA, each clause is treated as a distinct
discourse unit, whereas in a G&S-style analysis, multiple sentences are often chunked together with-
out any specific relations between them. Furthermore, G&S make no distinction between cores and
contributors, and only allow two intentional relations, whereas in RDA many types of intentional re-
lations are possible. This wealth of information is both a problem and an opportunity. A problem in
that even if we only consider RDA segments as candidates for segments in the G&S sense, we still
have a number of possible candidates for DSP status to choose from. (Notice that Moser and Moore’s
principles leave open the possibility that not all RDA segments are associated with a distinct DSPs,
hence that the mapping from G&S-segments to RDA-segments is not 1:1.) An opportunity in that we
can compare Grosz and Sidner’s claims with claims made within the RST framework, as already seen
above.
The issue we focused on in this study are embedded segments. Moser and Moore themselves raise
the question of how to treat embedded cores– spans of text that, while expressing the DSP of an RDA-
segment, have in turn the complex structure of an RDA-segment. Moser and Moore do not analyze
this problem in detail; but several examples in which the antecedent of a pronoun is contained in an
embedded nucleus, and this nucleus expresses an intentional relation, are discussed by Fox (1987) (p.
101), and in practice, we found a number of such cases in the Sherlock corpus. A related issue,
not raised before in the RDA literature, is how embedded and not embedded contributors should be
treated The issue of embedded segments is of interest from the point of view of G&S’s theory, both in
that it can shed some light on the notion of DSP, and because it raises some questions about whether
the attentional state really works as a stack.
The issue of embedded segments is also interesting as a way of comparing G&S’s claims with
Fox’s claim that it is entities in ‘active’ or ‘controlling’ propositions that are accessible for pronominal
reference.7 This claim can be reformulated in focus stack terms as suggesting that subordinated focus
spaces associated with the contributors in an RDA-segment are not immediately popped, but stay on
the stack until the RDA segment of which they are a part is completed. (For example, in the case in
Figure 1 and 2, should segment 2.1-2.2 be popped as soon as we are done processing it, or should it
remain on the stack until the whole RDA-segment is over, given that it participates in the intentional
relation that determines the superordinate segment?)
Embedded cores are also a good topic of comparison between G&S’s theory and Veins Theory.
Although VT is formulated in RST terms, it can be interpreted as stating that the antecedents introduced
in RDA segments that are themselves cores of superordinate segments remain on the stack even after
the RDA-segment of which they are a part is completed. So, for example, the antecedents associated
with the main RDA segment in Figure 1–those introduced in discourse units 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, and 3.2–
would remain on the stack if this segment was in turn the core of an embedding segment.
3.3 Stacks Versus Caches
A further reason why the issue of embedded segments is interesting is that while Fox’s hypothesis is
not entirely incompatible with G&S’s views (embedded contributors could be seen as being related
by a satisfaction-precedes relation) it does stretch the sense in which the attentional state can be
7A proposition is ACTIVE if it’s part of the same RST scheme as the proposition in which the pronoun occurs; whereas a
proposition is CONTROLLING if it’s part of a scheme which dominates the scheme in which the pronoun occurs.
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interpreted as a ‘stack’. In a discourse with the structure in Figure 1, for example, in order for the
contributor 2.1-2.2 to stay on the stack while processing 3.1-3.2, while at the same time ensuring that
the material in 3.1-3.2 updates the appropriate focus space (the one which was introduced to store the
material in 1.1-1.2–see Figure 2), we need to assume fairly complex sequences of stack operations.
More precisely, we need to hypothesize that when segment 2.1-2.2 is completed, the order on the stack
of the focus spaces for 1.1-1.2 and 2.1-2.2 is temporarily reversed, which requires two pops and two
pushes. While G&S themselves assume auxiliary stacks and the like, it is clear that the more complex
the operations, the less attractive the model.
The obvious question is whether these problems disappear when the stack is replaced with a model
of the attentional state like that proposed in (Walker 1996, 1998). Walker claims that the attentional
state is best viewed as a cache rather than as a stack. Her proposal is motivated by three problems with
the stack model. First of all, she argues, the stack model cannot explain why the size of embedded
segments appears to affect the accessibility of antecedents on the stack. She exemplifies this point by
means of the contrast between (2) and (3) . ((Walker 1996), p. 256, Dialogues A and B.) In (2) (which
is part of the transcript of a call to a radio show about financial advice (Pollack, Hirschberg, and
Webber, 1982), the interruption in b.-d. by the radio show host (H) doesn’t seem to make the previous
segment inaccessible: caller C can refer in e. to an entity (the daughter) introduced just before the
interruption with a pronoun. However, the less acceptable (3) seems to indicate that the felicitousness
of such continuations depends on the length of the intervening segment. In this modification of the
previous example, where a further question/answer pair has been added, the continuation is much less
felicitous, whereas according to the stack model, the attentional state while processing (3g) is identical
with the attentional state while processing (2e).
(2) a. C: Ok Harry, I’m have a problem that uh my-with today’s economy my daughter is
working,
b. H: I missed your name.
c. C: Hank.
d. H: Go ahead Hank
e. C: as well as her husband
f. They have a child
g. and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting.
(3) a. C: Ok Harry, I’m have a problem that uh my-with today’s economy my daughter is
working,
b. H: I missed your name.
c. C: Hank.
d. H: Is that H A N K?
e. C: Yes.
f. H: Go ahead Hank
g. C: as well as her husband
h. They have a child
i. and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting.
The second phenomenon that, according to Walker, is not easy to explain with a stack model is the
function of Informationally redundant utterances (IRUs). These are utterances that ”... realize propo-
sitions already established as mutually believed in the discourse” (Walker 1996, p. 257). According
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to Walker, the fact that they are reintroduced means that they are not in fact accessible; the function
of IRUs, then, is to put them back (on the cache).
Walker’s third piece of evidence against the stack model is the fact that CFs are often ’carried over’
segment boundaries: this suggests that the antecedents introduced in a segment do not immediately
disappear when that segment is concluded, as we would expect if the corresponding focus space were
popped, but stay on until they have been replaced, as it happens in a cache.
In (Walker 1996), it’s not clear what should be the contents of cache elements; in (Walker 1998),
however, it is suggested that the cache should contain the b discourse entities which has been men-
tioned more frequently recently.
4 Methods
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
As said above, the reason why models of discourse structure have been studied in connection with
anaphora resolution (and generation) is that they claim to restrict the search for anaphoric antecedents.
The ‘goodness’ of a particular model depends therefore on two measures:
c accessibility: whether the antecedent of an anaphoric expression is on the stack at the moment
the anaphoric expression is encountered;
c ambiguity: how many distractors are on the stack at the moment that expression is encountered
- i.e., how restrictive the focus stack update mechanism is.
These is an obvious tension between the two measures: we can make all antecedents accessible by
leaving them all on the stack, and we can make an anaphoric expression completely unambiguous by
not keeping anything in the stack. The ’best’ model will be therefore the one with the best trade-off
between these two measures. In order to evaluate the extent to which the data support a theory of the
attentional state like the focus stack theory, we need to compute both of these measures.
The accessibility of an anaphoric antecedent is simple to measure. Our measure of the ambiguity
of an anaphoric expression d is more complex, and depends on both the number of entities on the stack
that match it, and the (inverse of) the distance between these entities and the anaphoric expression (a
matching antecedent further away will be less of a distractor, since according to Grosz and Sidner, a
closer antecedent will be preferred). We call this measure PERPLEXITY:
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where b is the number of elements on the stack; w p byzdŁr = 1 if discourse entity b matches d (see
below), and 0 otherwise; and  lLm d	b f	p byzdŁr = 1 if discourse entity is in the same focus space as d , 2
if in the previous focus space, etc.
4.2 The Corpus
What we call the Sherlock corpus is a collection of tutorial dialogues between a student and a tutor,
collected within the Sherlock project (Lesgold et al. 1992). The corpus includes seventeen dialogues
between individual students and one of 3 expert human tutors, for a total of 313 turns (about 18 turns
per dialogue), and 1333 clauses. The student solves an electronic troubleshooting problem interacting
with the Sherlock system; then, Sherlock replays the student’s solution step by step, criticising each
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step. As Sherlock replays each step, the students can ask the human tutors for explanations. Student
and tutor communicate in written form.
The Sherlock corpus was previously annotated using RDA to study cue phrases generation (Moser
and Moore 1996a; Di Eugenio et al. 1997). The research group which proposed RDA discusses the
following reliability results (Moser and Moore 1996a). 25% of the corpus was doubly coded, and
the  coefficient of agreement was computed on segmentation in a stepwise fashion.8 First,  was
computed on agreement at the highest level of segmentation. After  was computed at level 1, the
coders resolved their disagreements, thus determining an agreed upon analysis at level 1. The coders
then independently proceed to determine the subsegments at level 2, and so on. The deepest level of
segmentation was 5; the  values were .90, .86, .83, 1, and 1 respectively (from level 1 to 5).
The Sherlock corpus was converted into an XML format for the present tests. A portion of the
annotation of the example in Figure 1 is shown below.
<rda-relation id="jg1-06-04-09-g" type="intentional">
<core id="jg1-06-04-05-g" type="seGment">
<rda-relation id="jg1-06-04-05-g-dupl" type="cluster">
<cue id="jg1-06-04-c" type="temporal">Before</cue>
<first id="first_jg1-06-04-05-r">
<action id="jg1-06-04-a">
troubleshooting inside the test stations</action>
</first>
<second id="jg1-06-04-05-r" info-rel="step2-step1">
<matrix id="jg1-06-05-m">
it is always best
<action id="jg1-06-05-a">to eliminate both the UUT and
TP</action>
</matrix>
</second>
</rda-relation>
</core>
<contributor id="jg1-06-04-07-r" inten-rel="convince"
info-rel="act-reason">
<rda-relation id="jg1-06-06-07-g" type="intentional">
.....
</rda-relation>
</contributor>
<cue id="jg1-06-08-c" type="sequence">Also</cue>
<contributor id="jg1-06-04-09-r" inten-rel="convince"
info-rel="act-reason">
<rda-relation id="jg1-06-08-09-g" type="cluster">
....
</rda-relation>
</contributor>
</rda-relation>
Figure 3: A portion of the annotation of the example Fig. 1
4.3 Anaphora Annotation
We annotated about half of the Sherlock corpus for anaphoric information, using a much simplified
version of the annotation scheme developed by the GNOME project (Poesio 2000b), which is based
on the MATE meta-scheme (Poesio et al. 1999). More specifically, we marked each NP in the cor-
pus, specified its NP type (proper name, pronoun, the-np, indefinite NP, etc) and its grammatical
features (person, gender, number), and then we marked all ‘direct’ anaphors between these NPs (i.e.,
8It is unknown to us whether  was also computed on clusters, and on the specific informational relations used.
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no bridges). This scheme has good results for agreement (Poesio 2000a) and has already been used
for studying anaphoric accessibility (Poesio et al. 2000). We annotated a total of 1549 NPs, 507 of
which were anaphoric.
One problem we had to address was that in the RDA annotation, only tutor turns had been annotated
(because the students’ questions are very short), but many of the antecedents of anaphoric references
in the corpus were discourse entities introduced in the preceding student turn asking the question.
Following Fox, we included the first elements of such adjacency pairs (the student turns) a part of the
accessibility space for anaphoric expressions in the tutor turn To do this, we enclosed each student turn
in a special student-turn element, marked the NPs it contained, and made this turn by associating
with the student turn a special focus space which would be on the stack when processing the tutor turn.
The antecedents introduced in turns further away–e.g., in ‘tied’ adjacency pairs (Fox 1987)–are not
available; we counted the anaphoric expressions whose antecedent was unaccessible for these reasons
and factored them out.
A large proportion of the anaphoric expressions whose antecedent is not on the stack are proper
names. Because these expressions can be argued not to access the stack to find their antecedent, we
also counted them separately.
4.4 Computing Accessibility and Perplexity
We evaluated the different proposals concerning the extraction of available antecedents from an RDA
structure by running a script over the annotated corpus that simulates focus space construction accord-
ing to each hypothesis (we discuss the interpretation of the methods in the following section). When
the evaluation script encounters an anaphoric expression, it attempts to find its annotated antecedent
in the focus spaces that are on the stack according to the chosen stack update method.
In order to measure perplexity, the script also attempts to find all antecedents that match the
anaphoric expression (DISTRACTORS). The search for distractors depends on the type of anaphoric
expression and is based on heuristics. If the anaphoric expression is a pronoun, an antecedent matches
counts as a distractor if it grammatically agrees with the anaphor. If its a description, the script finds
the head noun of both anaphor and antecedent (using heuristics based on the POS tags of the content of
the noun phrases), and then attempts to match them (because we are working with a limited domain,
it was possible to hand-code the basic lexical relations among nouns). The search for distractors has
precision and recall of 88%.
4.5 Extracting Focus Space Updates from RDA Structures
We compared various ways of extracting focus spaces from RDA structure by letting the evaluation
script take a parameter specifying how RDA structures should map into focus stack operations. The
possible values of this parameter (and the corresponding behaviors of the script) are as follows.
1. All: Push a new focus space on the stack whenever a non-atomic RDA unit (both intentional segments
and informational clusters) is encountered, and pop this focus space when the constituent ends.
E.g., in Figure 1, push a new focus space for all three constituents of the top segment: 1.1-1.2, 2.1-2.2,
and 3.1-3.2.
2. Intentional Only / Imm Pop: Only push a new focus space when an intentional segment is encountered;
pop it as soon as the segment is completed. This is the simplest mapping from RDA into focus stack
operations.
E.g., in Figure 1, only push a new focus space for segment 2.1-2.2, and pop it as soon as that segment is
completed. 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, and 3.2 are just added to the top focus space.
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3. Intentional Only / Delay pop of cores: Only push a new focus space when an intentional segment is
encountered. Pop focus spaces introduced for contributor segments immediately; but keep on the stack
the focus space associated with a core sub-segment for as long as its embedding segment stays there.
This solution is reminiscent of the idea of ‘core percolation’ in Veins Theory.
4. Intentional Only / Partial delay pop of tribs Treat embedded cores as in the previous version, but in
addition, keep focus space introduced for contributors on the stack until the segment in which they occur
is completed; i.e., as long as they are ‘active’ in Fox’s sense.
E.g., in Figure 1, do not pop the focus space for segment 2.1-2.2 before processing 3.1-3.2.
5 Results
5.1 The Distinction between Intentional and Informational Relations
We look first at the impact of the distinction between intentional and informational relations, and
Grosz and Sidner’s claim that discourse structure is only affected by intentional information.
The following table shows the impact of the distinction on accessibility, i.e., the percentage of
anaphoric antecedents which can be found on the stack in each case. The line indicated as ‘All’
shows the percentage of antecedents which are accessible when both informational and intentional
relations push new focus spaces on the stack: ’OK’ indicates the number of anaphoric antecedents
which are accessible, ’NO’ indicates the number of antecedents which are not accessible, ‘Out of AP’
the cases in which the antecedent is not accessible because it’s outside the current Adjacency Pair, and
’PN’ the number of cases in which the antecedent is not accessible but the anaphoric expression is a
proper name (and can access its denotation through long term memory rather than the stack). The line
’Intentional Only’ indicates the percentages for the case when only RDA-segments result in a focus
space being pushed.
OK NO Out of AP PN
All: 199 74 63 158
Intentional only: 280 20 63 131
The table shows that separating intentional segments (that introduce new focus spaces) from in-
formational clusters (that don’t) makes more antecedents accessible; the result is highly significant by
the  Test ( t)ﬂ		y hP  ﬂs  ).
The result just shown is expected: creating more focus spaces (which will then be popped) makes
more entities inaccessible. The question is whether the increased accessibility makes the search more
difficult by leaving too many distractors on the stack. This is measured by our second metric, perplex-
ity. In the following table, Baseline is the model in which no focus space is ever popped; the other
models are as above.
Perplexity
Baseline 3.25
All 1.22
Imm pop of emb core and trib 1.81
Both focus stack models reduce the perplexity with respect to the baseline; and crucially, both
the model in which all spans are associated with a focus space, and that in which only intentional
segments are, bring the perplexity under 2 –i.e., with any of these models, anaphoric expressions are
on average unambiguous.
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5.2 Different Treatments of Embedded Segments
Let us consider next the treatment of embedded cores suggested by Veins Theory, and the treatment
of embedded contributors derived from Fox’s hypothesis. The first line in the table below shows the
percentage of antecedents which are accessible if we treat both embedded cores and embedded con-
tributors as distinct DSPs / separate focus spaces, which are closed off as soon as they are completed.
The second line shows what happens if we keep embedded cores on the stack as long as the segment
of which they are constituents remains on the stack, as done in Veins Theory. The third line, finally,
the results if we treat embedded contributors within an RDA-segment as remaining on the stack until
the segment is closed off–i.e., as long as they are ’active’ in Fox’s sense. In this table we have ignored
both cases in which the antecedent is inaccessible but the anaphoric expression is a proper name, and
the 63 cases in which the antecedent is inaccessible because it’s not in the same adjacency pair (see
discussion above).
OK NO
Imm pop of emb core and trib 280 20
Delay pop of emb cores 287 16
Delay pop of emb trib 310 8
The differences are not so large in this case, but the correlation is still significant (   t)¡  y h7


£¢ ) and in particular there is a highly significant difference between the simplest method for focus
stack update (immediately pop embedded segments) and the method in which the popping of em-
bedded contributors is temporarily delayed, and embedded cores remain on the stack (the ’active’
model).
The table below shows the impact of these two changes to the treatment of embedded segments
on perplexity.
Perplexity
Imm pop of emb core and trib 1.81
Delay pop of emb cores 1.82
Delay pop of emb trib 1.89
As we can see, neither of these treatments results in a significant difference from the simplest
model in which embedded segments are immediately popped.
5.3 A Simple Cache Model
We also considered a simple version of the cache model proposed in (Walker 1998). This model sim-
ply keeps the latest b discourse entities in the cache; whenever an entity is referred to anaphorically,
it takes the place in the cache of the oldest element there.
We tried several cache sizes (6, 10, 12, 18), but got worse balance between accessibility and
perplexity than with the stack models previously discussed. With a cache of size 6 we get a very good
perplexity of 1.79, but less than half the accessibility of the best focus stack model; whereas with a
cache of size 18 we get good accessibility, but with a perplexity of 2.47 (above 2).
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We can divide the concerns addressed in this work in two groups: which way of using an RDA anno-
tation to test G&S’s theory of the global focus works best, and how well the predictions of the theory
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are verified. A subtopic of the first is whether we can use ideas from RDA to make G&S’s theory–and
in particular, the notion of DSP–more specific. We consider these questions in turn.
6.1 RDA Analysis and Focus Stack Updates
Grosz and Sidner’s paper does not tell us how we can identify the DSPs in a discourse. In this respect,
our first interesting result is that we get a significantly better characterization of the attentional state if
we only associate DSPs with cores: i.e., if new focus spaces are only pushed on the stack when an in-
tentional relation in the RDA sense is observed, and not if only informational relations are. This result
in a sense validates the distinction introduced by Moser and Moore, and is especially interesting when
compared with Fox’s proposals (Fox 1987). According to Fox, informational relations affect accessi-
bility as well (although Fox’s study is not concerned with accessibility but with pronominalization, as
discussed shortly). It is also interesting to contrast this result with those obtained with Veins Theory
(Ide and Cristea 2000), where we also do not find a distinction between informational and intentional
relations (although nuclei are assigned a special role not unlike that of cores here).
6.2 Evaluating Grosz and Sidner’s Theory
If we use the RDA annotation scheme as a guide to identifying DSPs in the sense just discussed, all
focus stack update methods we considered clearly reduce the perplexity of anaphoric expressions, and
even with the version which keeps embedded contributors on the stack until the intention associated
with the core is achieved, we still find a perplexity lower than 2. And even the simplest way of
using RDA segments to drive focus stack update (immediate pop) leads to a version with a reasonable
performance from the point of view of accessibility as well: just 20 anaphoric antecedents out of
stack, and a perplexity of 1.81.
However, the best compromise between accessibility and perplexity is obtained when embedded
cores stay on the stack, and embedded contributors are only popped when an RDA-segment is closed.
If we adopt the version of the mapping according to which embedded contributors stay on the stack
until the RDA-segment to which they belong is completed, only 8 anaphoric expressions have their
antecedent outside the currently open focus spaces. Of these, five are cases of definite descriptions
that might be viewed as referring deictically to parts of the circuit, one is a cataphoric discourse
deixis, one is a temporal deixis (at this point), and one is an expression whose interpretation is very
ambiguous. In other words, adopting these rules for opening and closing focus spaces, virtually all
anaphoric antecedents are accessible.
The problem is that this method for focus stack update, inspired by Fox’s notion of ’active’ propo-
sition and by Veins Theory’s view of ‘core percolation,’ can only with difficulty be reconciled with
the idea that the focus space is a stack. Leaving these focus spaces open means that the attentional
state cannot be properly seen as a stack anymore, but has to be seen as a sort of list, since there is
no guarantee that the focus space associated with the core will be the last element on the stack. Fig-
ure 4 shows an example in which it is necessary to leave the embedded contributor 24.13-24.14 on the
stack, in order to solve the “other” voltage to some other voltage; at the end of the segment, this focus
space has to be removed while leaving the focus space for the core on top of the stack. Furthermore,
as said earlier, in the case of Figure 1 we need either series of pops and pushes, or a ‘discontinuous
focus space’ to make the embedded contributor accessible without eliminating the principle that new
entities are added to the focus space on top of the stack.
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24.13a Since S52 puts a return (0 VDC) on it’s outputs
24.13b when they are active,
24.14 the inactive state must be some other voltage.
24.15 So even though you may not know what the ”other” voltage is,
24.16 you can test to ensure that
24.17a the active pins are 0 VDC
24.17b and all the inactive pins are not 0 VDC.
Enable
effect:cause
24.13a 24.13b
Enable
24.14
cause:mental-effect
Concede
criterion:act
24.15 24.16
24.17a 24.17b
contrast1:
contrast2
criterion:act
Figure 4: A contributor that precedes the core
6.3 A Cache Model?
As said above, the complications above suggest that a cache might be a more natural model of the way
accessibility works. However, we also saw that if we replace the focus stack with a cache containing
discourse entities, as in the model proposed by (Walker 1998), we get worse results than with the
stack models. We are experimenting with models in which the elements of the cache are focus spaces,
which is also compatible with the ideas discussed in (Walker 1996).
7 Related Work
7.1 Fox
Fox (1987), although only concerned with references to singular and human antecedents, is perhaps
the most extensive study of the effects of discourse structure on anaphora in both spoken and written
discourses. Fox uses different methods for analyzing the two genres: she uses concepts from Conver-
sation Analysis, and in particular the notion of Adjacency Pair, for spoken conversations, and RST to
analyze written texts. Her main proposal about written texts is as follows:
A pronoun is used to refer to a person if there is a previous mention of that person in a
proposition that is ACTIVE or CONTROLLING; otherwise a full NP is used.
(Where a proposition is ACTIVE if it’s part of the same RST scheme as the proposition in which the
pronoun occurs; whereas a proposition is CONTROLLING if it’s part of a scheme which dominates the
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scheme in which the pronoun occurs.)
Fox’s proposals concerning pronominalization apply less well to references to objects (and even
in her corpus there are many references for which the hypothesis above would licence the use of a
pronoun are actually realized by a definite NP, which she explains by arguing that the principle above
is only one of many interacting principles that determine the realization of a NP); nevertheless, she
makes a lot of compelling points about structure. In particular, she makes it very clear that active
propositions should be accessible for as long as the scheme is open; and produces several examples
showing that material introduced in active embedded nuclei is accessible. Fox didn’t find references
inside active embedded satellites (but then again none of these is made via a pronoun in our corpus).
In addition, our study suggests that proper names behave differently from definite descriptions in that
the former are much less sensitive to discourse structure than the latter, so the two classes should not
be conflated like Fox does; and not separating informational relations from intentional ones restricts
too much the range of accessible antecedents, even if it may be correct as far as pronominalization is
concerned.
7.2 Veins Theory
Veins Theory (VT) (Cristea et al. 1998, 2000; Ide and Cristea 2000) is a recently proposed theory
of the effect of discourse structure on anaphoric accessibility, which relies on RST for its definition
of discourse structure, and whose predictions have been tested using an RST annotated corpus of
newspaper texts (Cristea et al. 2000). The propositions accessible to an anaphoric expressions are
computed by an algorithm that operates directly over an RST tree and involves two steps: a bottom up
step in which the ‘heads’ of each node in the tree are computed (where the head of a non-terminal node
is the concatenation of the heads of its nuclear daughters) followed by a top-down computation of the
VEIN EXPRESSIONS. The crucial idea of VT is that material introduced in nuclear nodes ‘percolates
up’ veins, where veins are paths in the tree all of whose arcs connect nuclear nodes; the antecedents
introduced in any node along the vein are accessible from all the nodes of the subtree which has the
top of the vein to which that node belongs as its root. The second idea of the theory is that antecedents
introduced in a satellite node to the left of a nucleus remain accessible to all nodes controlled (in Fox’s
sense) by that nucleus.
In some respects, the proposal presented here can be viewed as a generalization of the proposals
of VT: the material introduced in core constituents percolates up in a similar way, but we also allow
antecedents introduced by embedded contributors to the right of the nucleus to be accessible as long
as these contributors are active (in VT, only binary trees are considered).
The one point of contrast between the two theories is that in our proposal, we do not consider all
nuclei, but only the nuclei of intentional relations. We have seen that treating informational relations as
introducing focus spaces makes a big difference in terms of accessibility; the difference is significant
even if we allow these additional relations to remain open as long as the dominating relation is open.
The crucial case distinguishing the two theories are trees with the structure in Fig 5: in our theory X
would be available as an antecedent of Y, whereas in Veins Theory it wouldn’t.
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